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ABSTRACT 
Cooperative and corporate farms have retained an important role for agricultural production in many 
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Despite this importance, these farms' ownership 
structure, and particularly the ownership's effect on their investment activity, which is vital for 
efficient restructuring and the sector's future development, are still not well understood. This paper 
explores the ownership-investment relationship using data on Czech farms from 1997 to 2008. We 
allow for ownership-specific variability in farm investment behaviour analyzed by utilizing an error-
correction accelerator model. Empirical results suggest significant differences in the level of 
investment activity, responsiveness to market signals, investment lumpiness, as well as investment 
sensitivity to financial variables among farms with different ownership characteristics. These 
differences imply that the internal structure of the Czech cooperative and corporate farms will be 
developing in the direction of a decreasing number of owners and an increasing ownership 
concentration. 
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Transition Countries 
A Case Study of Collective and Corporate Farms 
in the Czech Republic 
Jarmila Curtiss, Tomáš Ratinger and Tomáš Medonos* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 17/February 2012 
Introduction 
Despite political efforts to invigorate individual and family farming in the transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, large-scale farming has retained a significant 
position in agricultural production across the region.1 Though not fully successful in their 
original intentions, privatization policies and property rights restitutions have nevertheless 
provided a wide scope for ownership and organizational adjustments that have resulted in a 
unique diversity of corporate farms’ governance constellations. Given similar production 
orientations, it could be expected that over the more than twenty years of transition, 
ownership structures would demonstrate tendencies toward consolidation, possibly in two 
directions, indicating a trade-off between economies of scale and corporate governance 
(lower agency costs) through ownership concentration. The farm ownership constellations, 
however, have remained highly heterogeneous, which suggests a high probability of great 
variability in their performance and future prospects. Nevertheless, and in spite of the 
cooperative and corporate farms’ dominance in the sector, their complex ownership and 
governance structures, particularly their effect on investment decisions vital to the efficient 
restructuring and future development of the sector, have not received sufficient attention 
from the academic community. 
Compared to corporate firms in mature economies, corporate farms' governance in transition 
countries was formed in conditions of weak legal protection of renewed property rights and 
minority shareholders’ interests, as well as strong bargaining positions of former collective 
                                                        
* Jarmila Curtiss, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development and Information, Halle (Saale), 
Germany, email: curtiss@iamo.de; Tomáš Ratinger and Tomáš Medonos, Institute of Agricultural 
Economics and Information, Prague, Czech Republic, emails: ratinger.tomas@uzei.cz, 
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1 Relatively low in number, the large-scale farms of mainly a corporate and cooperative legal form 
continued to cultivate a considerable share of agricultural land. For example, in Bulgaria and in 
Romania, the share of agricultural land cultivated by cooperative and corporate farms is nearly 50%, in 
the Czech Republic approximately 70%, and in Slovakia almost 90% (Lerman et al., 2004; Ministry of 
Agriculture of the Slovak Republic, 2010; Ministry of Agriculture of the Czech Republic, 2010). 
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farms’ management. These conditions hindered many claimants of historic ownership from 
withdrawing their property shares from agriculture (Schlüter, 2001). As a direct 
consequence, the property rights reforms initially led to highly dispersed ownership of the 
cooperatives and corporate farms with a great representation of insider (employee and 
managerial), as well as external ownership. Successive ownership development has been 
further cramped by only slowly emergent internal corporate environments and 
underdeveloped markets for agricultural ownership shares. This environment indicates a 
high probability of inefficient property rights allocation and high agency costs, which could 
be partially lowered by efficient firm governance instruments such as management bonding 
and monitoring mechanisms. The “new” owners, however, generally possess no knowledge of 
corporate bonding and control mechanisms, or their knowledge is limited only to their short 
experience accumulated post privatization. Each of these aspects amplifies the agency 
problems of corporate governance in transition agriculture. The separation of ownership and 
control over the corporate farms and underdeveloped corporate mechanisms suggest that the 
most distinguishing characteristic of corporate governance in transition agriculture is the 
large scope for managerial discretion. The area in which the scope for managerial discretion 
comes to its greatest effect is in firm performance and investment decisions, including 
generated internal fund use and distribution. The latter represents an issue often referred to 
as agency costs of free cash flow, which affects firm productive investment and restructuring. 
This relationship between large farm ownership structure and investment decisions lies at 
the heart of this study.  
The ownership-investment relationship is theoretically approached by introducing an 
assumption of internal financial constraint. Typically, the investment literature considers 
risk-neutral managers and financial constraints imposed by external providers of finance. 
Some studies, such as that of Bierlen et al. (1998), recognize that these assumptions may not 
be appropriate for agricultural production and acknowledge that internally-imposed credit 
constraints may be important. However, these authors assume that lenders and borrowers 
are likely to use similar risk aversion-related factors when determining credit constraints. In 
studies on ownership-investment relationships in a corporate setting, the internal and 
external financial constraints are assumed to have divergent origins. Internal constraint is, 
namely, considered a result of information asymmetries and incentive conflicts between 
managers and owners, both allowing for and motivating managerial discretion over 
investment financing.  
Empirical studies which examine the ownership-investment relationship and are built on 
similar assumptions were mostly conducted for mature market economies (e.g., Cho, 1998; 
Estrin and Jones, 1998; Hadlock, 1998; Chaddad et al., 2005; Gugler, 2005; Audretsch and 
Weigand, 2005; Ghosh et al. 2007; Danielson and Scott, 2007; Plunkett et al., 2010); only 
seldom were such studies carried out for transition countries (e.g., Prasnikar and Svejnar, 
1998, 2003; Mueller and Peev, 2007; Gugler and Peev, 2007; Domadenik et al., 2003; 
Domadenik et al., 2008; Hobdari et al., 2009, 2010)), and concretely for agriculture (e.g., 
Bukusheva et al., 2009; Zinych, 2009). The empirical results by Mueller and Peev (2007), 
which were obtained by analyzing more than 10 selected Central and Eastern European 
countries, support the existence of a high managerial discretion effect on investment in 
transition economies. These authors ascribe the resulting over-investment to the corporate 
governance institutions and weak law enforcement in transition countries. In their studies on 
firm restructuring during the transition to a market economy, Prasnikar and Svejnar (1998, 
2003) and Domadenik et al. (2003, 2008) analyzed whether widely-occurring employee 
ownership in transition constrained investment. Domadenik’s et al. hypothesis, that 
managers and employees bargain over the allocation of generated internal funds between 
wages and investments and thus decrease funds for fixed investment in less liquid capital 
markets, was not confirmed by the empirical data from Slovenian firms. However, Prasnikar 
and Svejnar did find a trade-off between investment and wages related to employee 
ownership, and argue that employed owners’ appropriate funds that are supposed to be used 
for depreciation investment. In their study of firms' investment behaviour in 15 transition 
economies, Gugler and Peev (2007) found a significant investment sensitivity to cash flow; 
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however, this had shown declining tendencies from 1993-2003. These authors attribute this 
trend to the decrease of agency problems related to the development of capital markets and 
corporate governance standards. Lízal and Svejnar (2002) found a positive relationship 
between investment and profitability in Czech cooperatives, and to a lesser extent in small 
private firms. They interpret this finding so that smaller and collectively-owned firms are 
more financially constrained. Hobdari et al. (2009) analyze the relationship between 
ownership and investment behaviour of Estonian firms in constrained and unconstrained 
financial regimes. Their results imply that ownership structure leads to differences in 
investment behaviour only in financially constrained regimes, where investment decreases 
with managerial and employee ownership. The authors attribute this result to insider owners’ 
preference to divert resources in higher individual income rather than investment in the firm. 
In a later study, Hobdari et al. (2010) examine the same data from a different prospective. 
They identify access to capital to be important for investment rates and find that firms owned 
by insiders, especially non-managerial employees, are more prone to be liquidity constrained 
than others.  
In the context of agriculture in transition countries, Bokusheva et al. (2009) found that 
Russian farms with a higher share of owners among managers show a higher and positive 
relationship between investment and cash flow; they interpret this result as being higher 
marginal productivity of capital in farms with higher managerial ownership. Another 
empirical study on large-scale farms’ investment behaviour by Zinych (2009) investigates, 
among other issues, an investment effect of farm legal forms. Nevertheless, neither of the 
studies explores or discusses the possible link between the managerial ownership-related or 
legal form-related results and investment effects of agency problems associated with diverse 
governance mechanisms.2  
As demonstrated above, with only a few investment studies on transition agriculture, the 
large-scale farm ownership-investment relationship remains vastly unexplored. The review of 
empirical studies also shows that despite some evidence of firm ownership-investment 
relationships in transition agriculture, its interpretation lacks the context of agency theory, 
which may offer vital insights on the lack of investment optimality in this type of farms. This 
study aims to assess the differential investment effect and long-run viability of various 
ownership forms, and thus to reduce the addressed research gap on an empirical case of 
Czech cooperative and corporate farms.3 For this purpose, it uses unique survey data on 
ownership structure and data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network from 1997-2008.  
The paper is structured as follows. The proceeding section outlines testable theory-derived 
predictions on the ownership-investment relationship. Section three describes the error-
correction accelerator model chosen as the method of investment analysis, as well as data 
and relevant estimation techniques. Section four delivers the estimation results, their 
interpretation and discussion. The last section then concludes the paper with lessons 
                                                        
2 Other studies of investment behaviour of farms in transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, for example, by Latruffe (2005) or Petrick (2004a, 2004b), focused on individual or family 
farms in Poland. These are, therefore, of a lesser relevancy for this study, which inquires into the 
specifics of large-scale (corporate) farms’ investment behaviour.  
3 The reasons for focusing the study on collective and corporate farms only are manifold. As mentioned 
above, cooperative and corporate farms play an important role in many of the transition countries, 
while agency problems that are characteristic for corporate or joint ownership with delegated 
management is a likely source of non-optimal investment decisions and restructuring. One could argue 
for the suitability of a comparative analysis between individual farms and farms with joint ownership. 
However, such a comparison would introduce an investment effect of heterogeneous financial 
conditions (credit constraints) between large and small individual farms (e.g., Bezemer, 2003), which, 
without concrete information on these conditions, would disturb the interpretation of the results on 
agency-investment relationship. For the convenience of this study, the ownership structure of 
corporate and cooperative farms is highly diverse. Therefore, this relationship can be well analyzed 
purely within the sample of these farms.  
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contributing to the debate in transition literature on the long-term performance of various 
ownership forms resulting from the extensive privatization/restructuring process, as well as 
to the more general debate in the corporate governance literature on the investment effect of 
governance through ownership.  
1. Ownership and investment - theoretical discussion  
1.1 Principal-agent relationship in investment literature  
Similar to the role of asymmetric information between the firm and the providers of external 
finance (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984), the conceptualization of 
agency theory that recognized costs borne by the firm arising from the divergent goals of 
managers and owners of the firm (e.g., Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) resulted in a recognition of financial constraints, which challenged the neoclassical 
theory of firm investment behaviour (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Jorgenson, 1963).4 The 
main adjustment to the neoclassical investment model concerned the consideration of the 
effect of differences in costs between firm internal and external finance (supply-side 
imperfection of the capital market) and non-optimality of investment decisions due to 
separation of ownership and control delegated to managers5 (demand-side imperfection of 
the capital market). It is widely accepted among financial economists that external finance 
constraints originating in either of the two theoretical issues – information asymmetries and 
incentive conflicts between (i) the firm and financiers or (ii) the owners and managers – 
result in investment sensitivity to fluctuations in firm internal funds.  
Under information asymmetries in capital market, managers and other insiders know that 
their firm offers attractive investment opportunities, while potential suppliers of external 
capital do not dispose of sufficient information to assess the investment returns (e.g., Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984). This is assumed to lead to a rejection of good 
investment projects' funding by the external financiers. An alternative reduction of the 
information asymmetries aimed at diminishing the finance constraint would result in an 
increase in the costs of external finance. As a consequence, for a firm with a potential for 
investment with positive present value, it may be more optimal to use internal resources. 
Fazzari et al. (1988) then argued that in perfect capital markets, a firm’s investment demand 
should not be limited by or depend on internal funds, since the cost of external and internal 
finances is equal, and external capital is fully accessible. However, in imperfect capital 
markets, which increase the cost of external finance or in which access to finance is 
constrained by risk resulting from information asymmetries between the firm and the 
provider of financing, firm investment activity will be more sensitive to generated profit (cash 
flow). Under a limited cash flow, this situation is expected to lead to an accumulation of 
capital that could be considered lower than an optimal capital accumulation under perfect 
capital market conditions. Evidence of excessive sensitivity to cash flow has thus been often 
interpreted as suggesting the existence of credit constraints. However, as suggested above 
and explained in a more detail below, such sensitivity can also reflect the effect of managerial 
discretion resulting from the separation of firm ownership and control.  
Agency theory and corporate governance literature posit that information asymmetries 
between owners and managers give managers a scope for discretion that can be utilized for 
                                                        
4 The neoclassical investment theory considers a world of perfect capital markets and optimal 
accumulation of capital. It assumes that the short-run investment of a firm represents a lagged 
response to changes in underlying market conditions, as well as the tax structure, both of which affect 
the cost of capital (user cost of capital) (Jorgenson, 1963). 
5 While the original thesis of separation of ownership and control was conceptualized by Berle and 
Means (1932), the managerial theory of the firm was formulated much later, by Marris (1963, 1964). 
The formal modelling of the managerial theory of investment was first offered by Grabowski and 
Mueller (1972). 
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pursuing goals and interests that deviate from the goals and interests of owners (Williamson, 
1963; Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managerial discretion can 
thus lead to non-optimal decisions from the owners’ perspective and to agency costs borne by 
corporate owners. One reason that managers behave less optimally than owners is that their 
personal wealth is not at stake (Jensen, 1986; Ang et al., 2000). Also, seeking higher 
appraisal, managers tend to present their work, and thus the firm's performance and its 
market standing, positively, and to follow a strategy of growth independent of the real returns 
on capital and investment6 (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972). In contrast to information 
asymmetries in the capital market that result in under-investment, the firm internal 
information asymmetries provide incentives to over-investment (Mueller and Peev, 2007). 
Moreover, managers are assumed to prefer financing the less optimal projects from internally 
generated funds (bargain with owners over free cash flow) to avoid external scrutiny of less 
optimal investment projects (e.g., by banks), and to show the tendency to waste some of these 
funds on perquisites (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, analogically to information 
asymmetries in the capital market, agency costs should result in investment sensitivity to 
generated internal funds. 
The effects of managerial discretion on the use of funds and resources allocation can be 
assumed to be partially modified by the conditions that are characteristic for transition 
economies. The effect of credit constraints can be expected to be amplified by lower liquidity 
of capital markets, and agency costs by the weak protection of property rights and legal 
framework for corporate governance. Predictions of the managerial discretion effect can also 
be altered by the cramped internal fund generation in agriculture during transition (e.g., 
Doucha et al., 2002). The lower liquidity of capital markets and insufficient free cash flow can 
be perceived to limit the tendencies of managers to over-invest, even when a large scope of 
discretion is available, such as in the case of weak governance. Furthermore, the lower 
liquidity and high transaction costs of an unsuccessful credit application could increase 
managers’ positions in bargaining over free cash flow. The investment effect of agency costs 
of joint ownership and delegated control can be assumed to be higher in transition, as 
managers will tend to address low productivity problems through investments 
(modernization) rather than farm-internal restructuring to avoid conflicts with employed 
owners.7  
Despite any well-founded rationale for the expectation of a significant effect of agency costs 
on the investment behaviour of large farms in transition, their empirical investigation is 
challenged by many other factors that are possibly captured in the investment sensitivity to 
cash flow or other financial variables. As suggested above, the investment sensitivity to 
financial variables can simultaneously depict the effect of financial constraints from 
information asymmetries between the firm and suppliers of external finance, as well as 
constraints of less liquid capital markets. Furthermore, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argued 
that the investment sensitivity to financial variables can also be purely justified by the fact 
that external funds are more costly than internal funds for all firms as long as some 
transaction costs are involved. Similar to Poterba (1988), they also argued that, since current 
investment depends on both current and expected future changes in the desired capital stock, 
it is possible that information on cash flow helps to forecast future profitability and 
investment opportunities. This, again, would result in higher investment sensitivity to cash 
flow. Despite the awareness of various sources of investment sensitivity to financial variables, 
the interpretation of empirical findings remains ambiguous. Only sufficiently detailed 
                                                        
6 This is also in line with Schwalbach and Grasshoff’s (1997) and Murphy’s (1994) arguments and 
findings that managers’ remuneration derives particularly from the size of the company.  
7 In many transition countries, privatization to employees was a widely-applied form of state 
ownership privatization (see, e.g., World Bank, 1996; Blanchard, 1998; Frydman et al., 2000). Also, in 
the case of privatization/transformation of agricultural assets in the Czech Republic, considerable 
shares were privatized based on years of employment in the collective farm (see, e.g., Divila 1996, 
2001; Curtiss et al. 2006).  
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empirical data underpinning the firm ownership variability investigated within a relevant 
investment model and a comprehensive theoretical discussion can help to shed more light on 
the determinants of corporate farms8 investment behaviour and to filter out the ownership 
(agency) effects.  
1.2 Ownership characteristics and investment - predictions  
Various forms of joint ownership can be outlined by characteristics such as the degree of 
ownership dispersion (size of ownership shares and number of owners), imbalances in the 
share sizes among shareholders (large or majority versus small or minority shareholders), or 
the distribution of ownership and decision-making powers between external and internal 
owners (management and employees). These ownership characteristics form diverse 
environments for firm governance, including owners’ approaches to risk and incentives to 
engage in active management monitoring, as well as incentives and discretionary scope for 
managers to maximize their personal utility on the expense of shareholders wealth. In this 
paper, particular attention will be paid to the investment effect of ownership dispersion 
versus concentration, and external versus internal (employee) ownership.  
Dispersed ownership of a firm represented by small ownership shares distributed among a 
large number of owners may provide insufficient incentives for any one investor to monitor 
and control the performance of the firm or the quality of investment project; on the other 
hand, where there are large dominant shareholders, the returns to active governance are 
greater (Mayer, 1996). The lack of incentives to active governance, therefore, leaves the 
management of the dispersed-ownership firms with a larger scope for discretion and 
maximization of its own utility at the expense of the owners. Hence, dispersed ownership 
calls for greater attention to be paid to corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate 
governance scholars such as Schleifer and Vishny (1997) believe that through incentives 
and/or disciplining mechanisms, managers are effectively constrained from taking actions 
that are not in the best interest of the owners.9 Dispersed ownership can thus be identified as 
an ownership characteristic that makes firms prone to suffer from high agency costs, or if a 
corrective corporate governance mechanism is applied, from costs of corporate governance 
implementation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983, 1985). Both cost 
categories will affect the demand for capital, as they have an impact on the returns on 
investment. Nonetheless, the main motivation for dispersed ownership, which is the 
possibility of diversification and higher capital supply (Fama and Jensen 1985), should not be 
disregarded. A firm's rational decision for or against fast growth and/or diversification 
through increased equity brought in by external investors would then reflect the trade-off 
between the returns to scale and scope, and the associated agency costs of ownership 
dispersion.  
The opposite ownership characteristic, ownership concentration, defines a situation in which 
investors decide to invest into higher shares, and hence characterizes owners who likely have 
a higher entrepreneurial interest and more trust in the performance of the business. The fact 
that owners have more at stake is assumed to stimulate them to develop a more efficient 
corporate governance structure, including better monitoring, controlling and incentive 
mechanisms for the firm's management. In a similar vein, Mayer (1996: 11-12) argues: 
"Where there is concentrated ownership, there may be a greater willingness to discipline 
                                                        
8 In this study, cooperatives are treated as farms with corporate governance, since either the obligation 
of connecting cooperative membership to work in the cooperative, nor the one member-one vote 
voting rule are included in the actual commercial law of the Czech Republic (Law nr. 513/1991 of the 
Code of Law, Commercial Code). Most Czech agricultural cooperatives do not choose the rules 
traditionally defining producer cooperatives in academic literature. 
9 In many cases, the monitoring functions are then delegated to internal or external controllers (e.g., 
members of the Board of Trustees, or Supervisory Committee). However, for the same incentive 
reasons as those mentioned above, organizations with high ownership dispersion lack a strong back-
coupling between the owners and controllers. 
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poorly performing management as well as more incentive to intervene and exercise 'voice' 
rather than 'exit'." The more efficient control of managers' behaviour and activity then 
reduces managerial transaction costs10 and leads to higher performance and a more optimal 
investment decision.11 Higher economic performance means higher returns on capital and 
lesser reasons for avoiding bank scrutiny of the investment projects, resulting in lower 
investment sensitivity to internal funds. 
When applying modern corporate governance concepts to agriculture in transition 
economies, transition ownership and financial market specificities need to be considered. In 
many cases, including Czech agriculture, ownership structures evolved under the supervision 
of the managers of former collective farms. The decisions of persons eligible to receive 
property shares (transformation claims) regarding how to handle these shares were, 
therefore, made in conditions of managerial discretion and hence cannot be considered 
optimal. The discretionary space given to former managers carrying out the transformation 
of former collective farms can be assumed to be utilized to sustain a large scale12, an ongoing 
degree of discretion over the true value and the potential productivity of existing assets, and 
to secure their future managerial position. This information asymmetry provided 
management with a strong bargaining position, particularly in negotiations over small 
transformation claims, the settlement of which was accompanied by relatively high 
transaction costs to the eligible person. Therefore, despite high interest in financial 
settlement due to wealth constraints, decisions made by the eligible persons to 
transformation claims can be expected to be rather skewed towards leaving the property 
shares with (in other words, investing in) the successor companies and to be independent of 
allied agency costs detrimental to them as principals. Dispersed ownership in transition is, 
therefore, expected to provide for a larger scope for managerial discretion and higher agency 
costs than in a mature economy. 
Contrary to farms aiming to sustain a large-scale, farms and managers who chose to increase 
ownership concentration have utilized the moment of transition to capital and production 
restructuring and lowering coordination costs. To lower the transaction costs of 
reorganization, these farms were formed by consolidating assets by approaching eligible 
persons to larger transformation claims, mainly claimants of historic property. Ancillary 
assets were then to a degree leased from the persons eligible to other (smaller) 
transformation shares. In the early stages of transition, new equity investments were non-
existent and in the latter stages of transition are rather rare. Parts of the precursor collective 
farms encompassing either (i) less productive assets or (ii) property claimed by eligible 
persons from privatization who did not meet an agreement on lease or financial retribution of 
their property claims with successor farms, or did not want to become shareholders, were 
then subjected to liquidation. Farms with larger ownership concentration can be, in general, 
considered to be less affected by transition specifics and the theoretical concepts presented 
above. 
                                                        
10 Managerial transaction costs are agency costs of free cash flow dispersion, replacement resistance, 
resistance to profit liquidation or merger, power struggles, excessive risk-taking, excessive 
diversification, excessive growth, etc. 
11 As ownership and control are separated, this ownership characteristic still leads to a higher than 
optimal investment activity than if ownership and control are concentrated in the same hands. 
12 The managers’ interest in retaining large farm scale could relate to their subjective believe of large-
scale economic superiority, but also other economic and social incentives such as high transaction 
costs of dismantling the real estate assets, impact of liquidation and resulting lost of transformation 
claim value to numerous claimants as well as employment on the managers’ social standing, lack of 
liquidity for financial retribution of liabilities to persons eligible to transformation share or securing 
own employment with high social status. Some of these aspects are discussed below in the main text.  
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Due to the fact that the precursor collective farms did not develop in free market conditions 
but from several rounds of forced collectivization13, successor farms that retained size close to 
the precursor collective farms’ size can be assumed to suffer from diseconomies of scale. 
Retaining such size was then possible mainly by means of transforming liabilities to many 
persons eligible to mainly small transformation claims into equity. Therefore, rather than 
facilitating the acquisition of capital (equity) with the aim of increasing economies of scale, as 
would be expected in mature economies, dispersed ownership in transition is predicted to 
relate to diseconomies of scale.  
Moreover, the supply (sustenance) of capital secured through dispersed ownership allowed 
the acquisition of existing but antiquated capital, which required a high degree of 
modernization and technological adjustment, and thus significant investment activity to 
facilitate future competitiveness of these farms. Still, for farms (managers) who believed in 
the economic superiority of a large scale, this could have been a rational decision, since 
dismantling the existing (real estate) assets was related to extremely high transaction costs 
and the purchase of new assets could be hindered by credit constraints, transaction costs of 
credit application and, in the case of successful debt financing, by higher risk of premature 
liquidation. The high need for investment into restructuring and modernization in farms with 
high ownership dispersion simultaneously represents the owners’ high reliance on 
managerial expertise, which again increases the capacity for managerial discretion and its 
related agency costs.  
The time of economic transition is further characterized by weaker corporate governance 
(e.g., Mueller and Peev, 2007), which again affects particularly corporate farms with more 
dispersed ownership. As mentioned above, new shareholders and especially shareholders to 
agricultural assets lacked experience with active corporate governance. Indeed, the 
monitoring capacities of small shareholders who were former employees in collective farms 
can be further considered as hindered by their highly specialized technical qualification, low 
education and low entrepreneurial knowledge. Also, the extremely small shares of average 
shareholders or the significant majority of owners in farms with dispersed ownership 
amplifies the effect of disincentive in active governance. Delegating the 
monitoring/controlling capacity to specialized agents could improve governance in such a 
situation. However, because of the small shareholders' lacking connection to relevant 
specialists, members of supervisory bodies were often proposed by managing staff, mostly 
from historic networks. Such management control can be assumed to be less rigorous than 
potential control performed by fully independent and qualified monitoring agents.  
As already suggested, the interplay of all these factors related to dispersed ownership in 
transition creates an environment for greater managerial discretion and higher agency costs 
than would a similar firm ownership dispersion structure in a mature economy. This 
environment’s effect on farm investment behaviour remains, however, ambiguous. The 
theory-derived investment effect of managerial discretion – overinvestment and higher 
investment sensitivity to cash flow – is not as clear-cut in the context of transition. Financial 
market environment in transition assigned by liquidity constraints – liquid capital market, 
together with population wealth constraints – are expected to limit management in its 
investment pursuits. Low farm liquidity, less collateralizable assets and lower performance14 
of farms with high ownership dispersion further constrain these farms’ credit access or 
financing from internal funds. All these factors might reduce managers’ capacity to 
                                                        
13 Before the establishment of collective and state farms during the socialism, farms were owned only 
individually or considered as a family undertaking. 
14 In a situation of less liquid capital markets, financial constraints vary, with performance indicators 
characterizing the firm. Performance and financial constraints are assumed to be related. Farms 
performing better are assumed to be less limited by barriers to raising capital externally. This 
relationship has been suggested, e.g., by an empirical study by Medonos (2006). 
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overinvest, even in a situation of large scope for discretion, and could result in 
underinvestment rather than overinvestment15. 
Lastly, the prediction of higher investment sensitivity to internal funds in the case of larger 
scope for managerial discretion could be mitigated by the transition characteristics of small 
shareholders. As many of the small shareholders are former property claimants who did not 
succeed in their efforts of claiming property rights, withdrawing and obtaining monetary 
settlements for their property, the “imposed” shareholding is likely reflected in their low 
interest in farm future performance, and thus investment activity. From this it would follow 
that these shareholders would mainly pursue an early reversal of their "investment" (exit) 
and/or payment of dividends, and would not pursue growth opportunities16. This would 
suggest an imperceptible level of small-owners’ reliance on information from management, 
which would modulate the effect of internal information asymmetries and managerial 
discretion on investment, mainly the investment sensitivity to internal funds. 
Table 1 depicts the above-discussed effects of ownership dispersion and concentration on the 
firms' governance, scope of managerial discretion, and consequently on economic 
performance and investment. The positive and negative signs indicate the increasing and 
decreasing effects of ownership variables on the variables in the first column of the table, 
respectively. The number of the signs (one or two) imply the comparative strength of the 
effect (between mature and transition economy). For example, the higher the ownership 
dispersion, the lower is the owners’ incentives to active governance. This effect is stronger in 
transition than it is in a mature economy.  
Similar to the differences between ownership concentration and dispersion, insider 
(employee) ownership and outsider investor ownership are characterized by different 
incentive structures and costs of managerial control. When compared to employee 
ownership, external ownership can be assumed to provide for lesser internal scrutiny due to 
the lack of day-to-day operation and management monitoring. If investors choose to become 
more actively engaged in a company’s operation and monitoring of management, they would 
face higher costs of such engagement in governance than would insider owners. Insider 
owners also have the specialization advantage over many external owners, making their 
monitoring more effective. Furthermore, there is an advantage assigned to employee 
ownership, which stems from an alignment of ownership and employment, and thus 
employed owners’ stronger incentive to contributing to firm performance (Dow, 2003). On 
the one hand, employment security stimulates higher employee performance; on the other 
hand, it results in financial pessimism such as higher aversion towards riskier investment 
projects and investment projects that introduce labour-saving technologies (Dow, 2003; 
Jones et al., 2005). Both performance incentives and risk aversion result in stronger 
incentives to monitor managerial performance and control over investment projects. 
Nevertheless, they have different impacts on long-run investment; in other words, on capital 
adjustment to growth opportunities. While the performance objective stimulates optimal 
long-term investment, risk concerns impact the choice of investment projects depending on 
their riskiness and the time horizon of their returns. In this context, employed owners are 
hypothesized to prefer certain current consumption of generated internal funds over their use 
for investment in projects with uncertain long-term returns.  
 
                                                        
15 Empirical results by Hobdari et al. (2009) support this hypothesis through their finding for Estonian 
firms showing that ownership concentration is important in determining the financial regime in which 
a firm operates. Firms with lower ownership concentration are more financially constrained than firms 
with higher ownership concentration.  
16 The choice between dividends or exit strategy might have changed slightly with increased direct 
payments after EU accession towards the dividend collecting strategy. 
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Table 1. Effect of ownership dispersion versus concentration on corporate governance, 
performance and investment  
 Mature economy Agriculture in transition 
 
Ownership 
dispersion 
 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
Ownership 
dispersion 
 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
Owners’ incentives to 
active governance  - ++ -- + 
Costs of active governance + -- ++ - 
Scope for managerial 
discretion + -- ++ - 
Economic (technical) 
performance 
- due to scope for managerial 
discretion 
- due to capital supply 
(economies of scope or scale)  
0* 
- 
+ 
 
0* 
++ 
- 
 
- 
-- 
- 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
Optimality of investment 
activity 
- due to managerial discretion 
- due to small vs. large owners’ 
characteristics (transition-
specific)  
- due to financial constraints 
(transition-specific) 
- 
-** 
 
 
 
 
+ 
++ 
 
 
 
 
- 
-- 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Investment sensitivity to 
internal funds 
- due to managerial discretion 
- due to small vs. large owners’ 
characteristics (transition-
specific)  
- due to financial constraints 
(transition-specific) 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
 
 
+ 
++  
--*** 
 
+ 
 
-- 
-- 
- 
 
- 
 
Notes: * This situation represents the trade-off between agency costs and capital supply through equity in 
the case of ownership structure optimization. ** Larger scope for managerial discretion characterizing 
dispersed ownership is predicted to result in overinvestment due to managers’ growth pursuit. *** This 
would correspond with the case when small shareholders’ exit strategy or strategy of maximum dividend 
payments reduces or eliminates the effect of the larger scope for managerial discretion on the use of internal 
funds for investments. 
Source: Own figure.  
Also, the horizon problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Furubotn, 1976), discussed mainly in 
the context of cooperatives, could contribute to what Dow (2003) calls finance pessimism of 
employee ownership. This problem arises when the owner’s residual claim on the net income 
generated by an asset is shorter than the productive life of that asset. This creates an 
investment environment that discourages owners from following up and contributing to 
growth opportunities (Cook, 1995). Like risk aversion, the horizon problem results in 
employed owners’ preference of current consumption to investment, that is, the distribution 
of enterprise surplus as current labour income and fringe benefits rather than reinvesting the 
surplus in the firm for future growth (e.g., Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970, and Vanek, 1970). 
OWNERSHIP AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: THE CZECH REPUBLIC | 11 
 
This investment conservatism of employee ownership can be expected to result in a lower 
and less than optimal investment level17 and lower investment sensitivity to internal funds.  
The insider owners' risk-aversion could be further assumed to motivate the avoidance of 
bank financing investment projects to prevent the risk of premature liquidation of the firm by 
the bank in the case of project failure. This would, contrary to previous predictions on 
investment sensitivity to internal funds, suggest the use of internally-generated funds for 
investment than for consumption. However, when the firm has a large number of owners 
lowering the effectiveness of and incentives to control over management, employed owners 
will, in line with their higher risk-aversion and performance interest, prefer additional 
scrutiny of proposed investment projects proposed by an external financial institution. 
Likewise, this would apply to a situation when the firm operates in volatile industries. Since 
generalities of the farms in our sample are farms with a high number of owners, and 
agriculture belongs to the highly volatile sectors, it is predicted that farms with a higher share 
of employee ownership will prefer external financing of investment projects over internal 
financing. A higher share of employee ownership will hence be expected to be assigned by 
lower investment sensitivity to internal funds. 
It is further hypothesized that in Czech agriculture the financial pessimism of employee 
ownership will be amplified by higher risk aversion of employed owners with wealth 
constraints and small alternative employment opportunities manifested in rural areas more 
than urban areas. This could reflect in a stronger tendency to favour current residual claims 
consumption over risky future consumption. This situation could lead employed owners to 
forego the use of internal funds for investment with longer-return period and result in even 
lower investment sensitivity to internal funds than would be expected in mature economies. 
The stronger apprehension for the loss of employment could also result in higher incentives 
to economic performance in transition. However, the generally large size of the workforce 
characteristic for agricultural companies with insider owners could defuse this effect.18  
The external owners’ costs of active governance are also expected to be higher in transition. 
Among the reasons for this argument is that the privatization process does not attract 
investors with a high interest in and understanding of the sector, and that privatization 
allows the transformation of property claims from restitutions into shares. Other factors 
reducing the effectiveness of governance was the gradually developing level of accounting 
standards and transparency, as well as communication and information technologies. The 
scope for managerial discretion over free cash flow related to external ownership is, 
therefore, expected to be larger in transition than in mature economies.  
Moreover, the effect of the horizon problem is predicted to be larger for transition 
agriculture. The main reason is embodied in the fact that many insider owners became 
shareholders in agricultural enterprises based on their employment status during socialist 
times. Acquiring shares as an employee after the privatization process during the transition 
period has been rare because of the non-tradable nature of shares and issues of internal 
shares valuation. The employed owners are therefore expected to be of a higher age, which 
results in the horizon problem being a more urgent issue.  
                                                        
17 The horizon problem, similar to the free-rider problem, can result in investment disincentives or 
non-optimality, and is specific to untradable (non-transferable or illiquid), insecure or unassigned 
property rights (to residual claims) issues common to producer cooperatives. The Czech cooperative 
farms, however, represent cooperatives that can be described as mature producer cooperatives, which, 
during transition, opted for remaining cooperative organizations, but with outside equity (external 
shareholding). These cooperatives, in many cases, also introduced a proportionality strategy to 
internally-generated capital. Therefore, this study does not deal with cooperatives as such, but with the 
question of the investment effect of the share of employee ownership in total ownership.  
18 The employed owners’ incentive to higher performance decreases with increasing size of the 
workforce which is also closely related to the cost of collective decision-making (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Hansmann, 1996). This factor is not discussed in more detail, since there is no clear relationship 
between the absolute size of the employed owners’ workforce and the share of employee ownership.  
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The discussed investment effects of employee versus external ownership are summarized in 
Table 2. The signs in the table are to be interpreted similar to Table 1; for example, the 
positive sign connecting "owners’ incentives to active governance" in the first row and 
"employee ownership" in the first column implies that the higher the share of employee 
ownership, the higher are the owners’ incentives to active governance. The double sign in the 
respective column for transition economies indicates that this effect is stronger in transition 
than in a mature economy. A negative sign and zero indicate the opposite relationship and 
neutral effect, respectively. 
Table 2. Effect of employee ownership versus external ownership on corporate governance, 
performance and investment 
 Mature economy Agriculture in transition 
 
Employee 
ownership 
 
External 
ownership 
 
Employee 
ownership 
 
External 
ownership 
 
Owners’ incentives to active 
governance  
- due to job security (incentive optimism)  
- due to risk aversion (financial 
pessimism)  
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
++ 
++ 
++ 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Costs of active governance  -- + - ++ 
Scope for managerial discretion -- + - ++ 
Economic (technical) performance  
- due to scope for managerial discretion 
- due to job security (incentive optimism) 
- due to risk aversion 
- due to horizon and free-rider problem 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
++  
++ 
++ 
-- 
- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
++ 
Optimality of investment activity 
- due to scope for managerial discretion 
- due to job security (incentive optimism) 
- due to risk aversion 
- due to horizon and free-rider problem 
0 
+ 
+ 
-* 
-* 
0 
- 
- 
++ 
++ 
0 
++ 
++ 
--* 
--* 
0 
-- 
-- 
+ 
+ 
Investment sensitivity to internal 
funds** 
- due to scope for managerial discretion 
- due to job security (incentive optimism) 
- due to risk aversion 
- due to horizon and free-rider problem 
- 
-- 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-- 
- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
Note: * Underinvestment; ** Larger number of employed owners is assumed.  
Source: Own figure. 
2. Method of investment analysis 
2.1 Investment model 
Following the Mairesse et al. (1999) deliberation on the development of investment models 
and the Bokusheva et al. (2009) discussion on investment models' suitability for the case of 
modelling investment behaviour in transition agriculture, we chose to apply the error-
correction accelerator model. This implies that we are not aiming to look for the "correct" 
investment model, but we select a model based on its theoretical specification and 
performance of the alternative models in previous applications. The advantages of the error-
correction specification of the accelerator model are that it allows the separation of the long-
run investment determinants from the short-run investment adjustments, as well as its 
quality of retaining information in the levels of output and capital stock (not only information 
in first differences). If data allow this specification then this characterization of investment 
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behaviour makes this model superior to other investment models applied to transition 
agriculture such as the basic accelerator model, or adjustment cost or Euler equations. An 
alternative Tobin q model is less relevant for transition agriculture since the q (market) value 
of the corporate farms does not exist. Another advantage of the specification of the error-
correction accelerator model is that it does not require any specification of adjustment cost. 
Due to spatial constraints on this paper, we describe the origin of the error-correction 
accelerator model only briefly. See, e.g. Mairesse et al. (1999), for a more detailed description 
of this model. 
The error-correction econometric approach was introduced into investment modelling by 
Bean (1981). The error-correction specification of the investment accelerator model nests the 
demand for capital equation, ititit jyak σ−+=  (Jorgenson, 1963) with the dynamic 
(accelerator) investment equation, with an autoregressive-distributed lag of length two (ADL 
(2,2) function). In the equation for the firms’ desired capital stock, kit denotes the (natural) 
logarithm of the desired capital stock for firm i in period t, yit denotes the logarithm of output 
(or sales) and jit denotes the log of the real user cost of capital. In the error-correction 
accelerator model, dynamic adjustment in capital, itkΔ , is approximated by 1,/ −tiit KI , where 
Iit represents investment and Kit the capital stock for firm i at the end of period t. It also 
assumes that the variation in the user cost of capital, jit, can be controlled for by including 
year-specific and firm-specific effects. The error-correction model can be written as follows:  
 ( ) itittitititiit
ti
ti
ti
it vdyykyy
K
I
K
I ++++−+Δ+Δ+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+= −−−−
−
−
−
ηϕφθθρα 2,02,2,01,10
2,
1,
00
1,
.  (1) 
The error-correction coefficient, φ , captures the long-run investment adjustment to the 
“desired level” of capital, dt is a time dummy, ηi is an unobserved firm-specific effect and vit is 
an error term (transitory shock). The remaining parameters capture the short-run dynamics. 
The variable yi,t-2 is added to the error correction accelerator model to allow for a test of the 
assumption of constant returns to scale that is necessary for the imposed long-run 
proportionality in the model.  
Since the commonly used accelerator model was developed for sectors other than agriculture, 
we must consider some of the specifics of agriculture for the intended application. 
Characteristics such as lower returns on capital, high sunk-costs of capital, and seasonality of 
production suggest possible investment conservatism and delays in adjustments of the 
desired stock of capital, as well as slower responsiveness to market signals. Therefore, we also 
consider the error-correction accelerator model to nest the dynamic investment equation 
with an autoregressive-distributed lag of length three (ADL (3,3) function). The resulting 
error-correction model then has the following form: 
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K
I
K
I
K
I
++++−+
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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−−
−
−
−
−
−
ηϕφ
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3,
2,
1
2,
1,
00
1, .  (2) 
Similar to numerous investment studies, we further add current and lagged cash flow scaled 
by the previous period’s value of fixed capital to the right-hand side of the investment 
equation to test the investment effect of these financial variables. This extension applies to 
both equations (1) and (2). Therefore, only the latter is presented, which yields the following 
specification: 
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In this error-correction specification of the accelerator model, we can test whether the cash 
flow (profit rate) plays the role of a long-run determinant of investment, or whether it is only 
a short-run variable that can be interpreted as reflecting the transitory availability of funds 
for investment purposes. Nevertheless, interpreting the significance of the investment effect 
of the cash flow variable is still ambiguous. It can reflect the presence of financial constraints 
on investment due to asymmetric information between investors and the firm (e.g., Fazzari et 
al., 1988). However, in the presence of adjustment costs, the level of cash flow to capital 
could contribute to the information on future profit or output expectations (Nickell, 1978) or 
investment opportunities that were not otherwise accounted for by such things as sales 
growth (Samuel, 1996). Also, as discussed in the theoretical section, in the presence of agency 
costs arising from the divergent goals between managers and owners, the γ parameters could 
capture managers' strategy towards the use of available internal funds for investment 
projects. Therefore, analyzing investment behaviour in the context of the firm-specific 
ownership structure and related financial conditions will allow more light to be shed on the 
sources of the investment sensitivity to cash flow. 
The theoretical predictions of firm-specific and particularly ownership-specific adjustments 
in capital stock and differences in responses to various shocks, including the availability of 
internal funds, directs the next extension of the investment model. Long-run panel models 
with heterogeneous dynamics were estimated in previous studies. For example, Pesaran et al. 
(1999) specified a co-integrating long-run development for various economies (countries), 
but allowed the varying of unit-specific short-run dynamics. In the context of investment 
behaviour modelling, Bokusheva et al. (2009) allowed both short-run as well as long-run 
dynamics to vary across observations, concretely farms. We will follow this latter approach 
and will allow investment behaviour to vary across three ownership variables (Zn, n = 1, ..., N; 
N = 3) - ownership concentration (Z1), external ownership (Z2), and owners' number (Z3). 
This yields the following model extension:  
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A more detailed description of the variables and data sources follows in the next section. 
2.2 Data and variables  
Data on farm investment, production, capital and financial variables originate from the 
official balance sheets, income statements and supplementary forms of the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network of the Czech Republic (FADN CZ) survey for the years 1997-2007. 
Data on farm ownership structure comes from a structured data collection in the Czech 
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Republic in 2004. This data survey was organized and funded by the Institute for Agricultural 
Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), Halle, Germany, together with the 
Research Institute for Agricultural Economics (VUZE), Prague, Czech Republic. The sample 
contains 117 agricultural companies with a combined crop and animal production of a legal 
entity status (cooperatives, JSC and LLC) for a minimum of 7 years of consecutive annual 
data between 1997-2008; from these, data on 41 farms are available for the entire 11-year 
period.  
The empirical model variables are all expressed in real values and contain the following 
information: 
K Farm stock of capital: includes all long-term tangible, intangible and financial assets; k 
denotes natural logarithm of K. 
I Value of gross investment between sequential periods calculated as the change in 
capital stock (representing net investment) plus depreciation and amortization. 
y Logarithm of farm total sales; Δy is the change in y between two following periods.  
CF Value of the farm’s cash flow that is available at the end of a given period for 
purchasing new capital stock at the beginning of a following period. The cash flow 
indicator is unavailable in the double-entry accounting. Therefore, it is calculated as 
retained earnings (profit or loss) plus depreciation and amortization. 
Zn  The n-vector of ownership variables (n = 3) that are time-invariant as data on 
ownership structure are available only for the year 2003. These variables are defined as 
dummy variables taking the value of 1 for values larger or equal to the median, 0 
otherwise. The first ownership variable, Z1, denotes an average (per owner) share in a 
farm's equity, or ownership concentration. The second ownership variable, Z2, 
represents external ownership, i.e. a share of external investors to the total number of 
owners. The third variable, Z3, denotes the number of farm owners.19 
TD Farm transformation indebtedness towards eligible persons to assets from restitutions 
and asset transformation (in the case of former collective farms). This dummy variable 
will be used purely as a control variable, i.e. a variable controlling for possibly related 
variability in asset valuation (degree of capital depreciation) and credit constraints. It is 
incorporated in the model in the same way that Z-variables are.  
dt Time dummy variables that are included to account for time-specific shocks common to 
all farms. 
The data used for estimations is kept in nominal prices20.  
                                                        
19 Ownership variables are generally assumed to be endogenous to the performance and the market 
value of the firm, which again should stimulate investments and therefore this endogeneity should be 
controlled for in the model. These theories are generally applied to firms traded on the stock exchange 
or firms in mature economies with full property rights' legal enforcement, a developed capital market 
and an investors' culture. The corporate ownership structure in the Czech agriculture is mainly a result 
of the transformation and privatization process dominated by former management and new owners' 
restructuring objectives and strategies. Due to the still-underdeveloped capital market and assumed 
managerial discretion, little (particularly efficiency-driven) dynamics in the ownership structure, and 
thus dismissible endogeneity in the ownership variables, is assumed. 
20 The main reasons for retaining the data in nominal prices are as follows: The analyzed agricultural 
companies are assigned by different production structures, i.e. they differ in their asset structure 
(share of machinery, equipment and buildings) as well as their product structure. While prices for each 
capital input and output have changed at different rates, mostly average price indexes are known for 
the sector. The average price indices' used for deflating the data to real terms could thus lead to firm-
level distortions of the investment (capital)-to-sale ratio. The traditional motivation behind expressing 
the data in real prices is the comparability of investment and sales over time. In the case of this study, 
the aim is not to analyze the development of the real investment volume, but analyzing the investment 
variability due to ownership differences. The time-specific fluctuation in investment due to price 
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2.3 Estimation method 
The above-specified model characterizes a dynamic process in which the dependent variable, 
current investment to capital ratio, is influenced by its past levels. Besides the autoregressive-
distributed lag, the investment model includes explanatory variables that cannot be 
considered strictly exogenous. The lagged investment to capital ratio can be assumed to be 
correlated with firm-specific effects. Also, growth in output (sale) may be correlated with 
these effects, and the current change in output (sale) is likely to be correlated with shocks to 
investment via the production function (Bond et al., 2003). In this case a pure occurrence of 
firm-specific (unobserved) effects, correlated or uncorrelated with other variables on the 
right-hand side of the estimated equation, requires more than traditional data within-firm 
transformation or first differentiation, which can be applied in the case of simpler panel 
model specifications. The reason for this is that estimates on such transformed data are not 
consistent on short time series (e.g., Mairesse et al., 1999; Roodman 2009a). The most 
advanced method of solving this econometric issue is the fully efficient Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM). For the estimation of empirical models with autocorrelation and other 
possible endogeneities in explanatory variables, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) suggest using the system GMM, which allows a combination of two equations 
and two samples of instrumental variables on transformed and untransformed data, which 
can be more efficient than first-difference GMM21. Because of the relatively large number of 
instruments compared to the number of observations, we estimate a one-step system GMM. 
We apply the programming package provided by Roodman (2009a) designed for statistical 
software STATA.  
3. Results 
3.1 Pooled error-correction accelerator model estimates 
Table 1 presents parameter estimates of the error-correction accelerator model without 
ownership variables derived from a dynamic investment equation with an autoregressive-
distributed lag of length two (ADL (2,2)) and three (ADL (3,3)) (see equation 3). Comparing 
the estimates of these two models shows that accounting for ADL (3,3) dynamics improves 
the model significantly. Testing the presence of the lag three effect (test of the joint 
significance of ρ1, θ2, and γ2) reveals that these parameters are jointly significant at the 5% 
significance level. Therefore, we further interpret Model 2 only.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
changes, which could be reduced using averaged (firm-neutral) price indices, can be depicted by the 
time dummy variables. To our opinion, it is, therefore, unnecessary to deflate the data and thus 
introduce a possible bias. 
21 In the literature, the "first-differenced" GMM proposed by Arrelano and Bond (1991) is also called 
Difference GMM. Both titles refer to the estimation procedure using first-differences of the data in 
order to eliminate the fixed effects. System GMM augments Difference GMM by estimating 
simultaneously in differences and levels; each equation being distinctly instrumented (Roodman, 
2009b). The advantage of applying system GMM as well is that it allows for the inclusion of time-
invariant regressors, in our case ownership variables, that would disappear in first difference GMM 
(see Roodman, 2009a).  
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Table 3. GMM estimates of the error-correction accelerator investment model for Czech 
cooperative and corporate farms in 1997-2007  
Dependent variable 
It/Kt-1 
Model 1 - Basic AR(2, 2) error 
correction model (s = 2) 
Model 2 - AR(3, 3) error 
correction model (s = 3) 
Indep. var. Coef. Coef. estimate P-value Coef. estimate P-value 
Constant α0 0.110 0.156 0.258 0.065 
It-1/Kt-2 ρ0 -0.142 0.077 -0.323 0.022 
It-2/Kt-3 ρ1 - - -0.199 0.013 
∆yt  θ0 0.062 0.195 0.134 0.040 
∆yt-1 θ1 0.029 0.545 0.108 0.061 
∆yt-2 θ2 - - 0.102 0.112 
kt-s - yt-s ∏0 -0.053 0.001 -0.065 0.011 
yt-s φ0 -0.004 0.560 -0.013 0.212 
CFt/Kt-1 γ0 0.280 0.073 0.208 0.000 
CFt-1/Kt-2 γ1 0.232 0.002 0.300 0.001 
CFt-2/Kt-3 γ2 - - 0.098 0.447 
# of obs. 850 689 
Overall fit (F-test) 12.52 0.000 11.02 0.000 
AR(2) test  -0.89 0.371 -0.94 0.348 
Hansen test 93.58 0.522 88.80 0.312 
Note: Estimates of coefficients for time dummies are not included in the table. 1)Instruments used: a) for 
first differences equation - lags 1 to 3 (2 to 3) of It-1/Kt-2, ∆yt, and CFt-1/Kt-2 in Model 1 (in Model 2); b) for 
level equation - all remaining explanatory variables (untransformed) included in the equation including 
time dummies and first differences of It-1/Kt-2 , of ∆yt, and CFt/Kt-1 in Model 1 and first differences of lag 1 of 
It-1/Kt-2 , of ∆yt, and CFt/Kt-1 in Model 2. The estimates of the lagged dependent variables in Model 1 and 
Model 2 are found in the range between their OLS (upward-biased) estimates and within group (or fixed 
effect) (downward-biased) estimates, which is an indication of good consistent estimates (see Bond, 2002 
and Table A-6 in the Appendix). 
The first two parameters following the constant refer to the short run effect of the past 
growth in capital stock on the current investment activity. Similar to the study by Bokusheva 
et al. (2009) for Russian farms, this effect is found to be significantly negative, with a range 
between -1 and 0, which implies a cyclical development of investment activity oscillating 
around and approximating to zero over time. The cyclical development of investment activity 
can be well explained by the lumpiness of investment (indivisibility and large size of acquired 
assets) and limited financial resources due to less liquid capital markets and simultaneously 
lower productivity of agriculture, which leads, therefore, to lower attractiveness of the sector 
for lending. The decreasing tendency in the cyclical development of investment over time 
could refer to improving credit market conditions or bettering performance of the farms due 
to structural adjustments. 
The following three parameters capture the transitory investment effects of the past growth 
in output (sales), ∆yt, ∆yt-1, ∆yt-2, incorporated in the model to proxy a response to changes in 
product demand, and hence to increasing or diminishing market opportunities. The strongest 
positive investment response is the response to the most intermediate changes; it slightly 
weakens with the further lags of the sale changes.  
The next variable is the error-correction term introducing the long-run investment 
adjustment to the optimal capital level. Under the assumption of optimal investment 
behaviour, the coefficient φ  is expected to be negative, since the actual capital level lower 
than its “desired level” should be followed by higher future investment and vice versa (see, 
e.g., Bond et al., 2003). This behaviour is confirmed by the highly significant negative 
coefficient estimate. Farm investment activity is thus congruent with the long-run efficient 
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adjustment to the "desired" future level of capital. However, the size of adjustment is 
unexpectedly low. The parameter suggests a 7% approximation rate in capital stock to long-
run capital optimum over the analyzed period.22 Such a low capital adjustment rate was also 
found by Bokusheva et al. (2009) for Russian farms. This implies high capital adjustment 
costs in transition agriculture.  
The three γ parameters embody investment sensitivity to the level of generated internal 
funds. This sensitivity is particularly high and significant with respect to cash flow-to-capital 
ratio of the intermediately preceding year, and weakens with the number of lags. The test of 
the joint significance of the three γ parameters further implies that the investment sensitivity 
to internal funds is not only transitory, but captures a long-run relation. The most common 
interpretation of these parameters would be that the analyzed farms depend on their own 
financial resources. Nevertheless, cash flow levels could also translate into an expectation of 
future profits, and the significant parameters then imply an investment reaction to this 
expectation. In the context of transition agriculture, it is still plausible to expect that the γ 
parameters capture, at least to a degree, persistent financial constraints and high costs of 
capital market transactions; it is also possible that they capture farms' cautious behaviour 
towards bank credits due to both unsettled property rights to agricultural assets and to a fear 
of premature bankruptcy in the case of investment project failure due to volatile market 
conditions.  
The last parameter to be discussed is the parameter with respect to the scale factor, yt-2, the 
value of which is not significantly different from zero. This implies that the long-run elasticity 
of capital to sales is unity. The production function is thus characterized by theory-consistent 
constant returns to scale.  
3.2 Ownership-specific heterogeneity in investment behaviour 
The estimation results of the error-correction accelerator model with ownership-specific 
heterogeneity in farm investment behaviour will be interpreted in connection to a mean 
statistics analysis of investment and performance differences between the examined 
ownership groups. Table 4 provides respective mean statistics for the ownership groups and 
results of the two-sample t-tests. Table 5 presents parameter estimates of the error-
correction models with ownership-specific variability in investment behaviour. The 
advantage of the investment model analysis is the simultaneous consideration of all three 
ownership variables, which allows the investment effect (short- and long-run) of each of the 
ownership variables to be filtered out, while controlling for the effects of the remaining 
variables. Models 3 and 4 in the table are the most parsimonious versions23 of the model as 
defined in equation 4; the only difference between the models is the addition of the variable 
'transformation indebtedness' in Model 4, which should help to control for supplementary 
credit constraints.  
                                                        
22 For industries in mature market economies, Mairesse et al. (1999) find the capital stock error 
correction to be of a value between 20 to 35%. 
23 Due to the large number of parameters in the complete model, we aimed for the most parsimonious 
model. We step-wise eliminated all variables with p-value higher than 0.3. 
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Table 4. Mean statistics comparison and two-sample t-test for farm ownership groups  
 Owners’ number Ownership concentration1) External ownership2) 
 < 
median 
≥ 
median 
p-
value* 
< 
median 
≥ 
median 
p-
value* 
< 
median 
≥ 
median 
p-
value* 
It/Kt-1 0.137 0.119 0.059 0.121 0.135 0.143 0.128 0.128 0.947 
St/Kt 1.021 0.896 0.000 0.991 0.935 0.035 0.980 0.906 0.012 
It/St-1 0.126 0.130 0.754 0.112 0.142 0.024 0.131 0.127 0.825 
CFt/Kt-1 0.180 0.133 0.000 0.143 0.171 0.001 0.168 0.136 0.001 
∆St/Kt-1 0.004 0.006 0.829 -0.004 0.012 0.091 0.003 0.009 0.595 
Kt 3)  36.431 80.237 0.000 49.775 63.592 0.000 56.490 62.674 0.023 
St 3) 30.828 69.628 0.000 43.678 53.434 0.000 48.493 52.912 0.077 
Owners’ 
nr. 
85 555 - 402 234 0.000 188 501 0.000 
Ext. own. 
2) 
0.652 0.839 0.000 0.794 0.705 0.000 0.605 0.894 - 
Transf. 
debt4)  
0.439 0.142 0.000 0.385 0.203 0.000 0.378 0.179 0.000 
Cap. con. 
I1) 
0.753 0.149 0.000 -0.017 0.900 - 0.606 0.113 0.000 
Cap. con. 
II5) 
0.111 0.126 0.001 0.076 0.166 0.000 0.134 0.116 0.000 
Note: * P-value for a two-sample t-test; 1) per owner share in equity (in thousands of CZK); 2) share of the 
number of external owners in total number of owners; 3) in millions of CZK; 4) indebtedness rate from 
ownership transformation (debts toward eligible persons from transformation in value of total assets); 5) per 
owner share in legal capital (in millions of CZK).  
As Table 4 illustrates, investment activity level given by the ratio It/Kt-1 differs significantly 
only between farm groups distinguished by the number of owners. Farms with a larger 
number of owners display significantly lower investment activity than farms with a smaller 
number of owners. The former are also assigned by lower scores in performance indicators – 
sales-to-capital ratio (output productivity) and cash flow-to-capital ratio (profitability or 
liquidity). This result suggests that the scale and scope achieved through equity investment 
by a large number of small owners did not provide for sufficient economies that would 
outweigh the agency costs related to dispersed ownership. Indeed, as the significance of the 
scale parameter φ01 in Table 5 indicates, the group of farms with a larger number of owners is 
characterized by decreasing returns to scale. Thus, joint farm ownership by a large number of 
shareholders, which has contributed to preserving large-scale farms, does not prove to be 
motivated by economies of scale. 
In Table 4, further observed lower investment activity of farms with larger number of owners 
could be a rational response to lower returns to capital. However, as theories suggest, 
dispersed ownership provides a larger scope for managers maximizing their own utility, 
which is rather assumed to result in overinvestment. The observed investment activity seems 
to reflect the transition-specific incentive problem of dispersed ownership rather than 
managerial discretion. The lower investment activity could actually be a result of owners’ low 
interest in the farm’s future performance, since for many of these owners becoming 
shareholders represented the only alternative to losing the value of their transformation 
claims. These owners’ lower interest in farm future performance and prospects could also 
explain why the expected higher scope for managerial discretion does not significantly reflect 
in higher investment sensitivity to cash flow.24 This situation rather leaves managers with a 
                                                        
24 This effect is captured in the statistical insignificance of parameters γ01, γ11, or γ21, which are, 
however, not included in the most parsimonious model presented in Table 5. 
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small scope for discretion over investment, but with a large scope for discretion over other 
activities that could increase their personal benefits and contribute to lower overall 
performance of the farm.  
Furthermore, the parameters ρ01, and ρ11, which capture the investment response to the past 
investment level indicate that the higher number of owners reduces the generally observed 
cyclical development of investment; in other words, increases current investment response to 
the past level of investment. This could relate to the larger size of capital stock in this group 
of farms, i.e. the lower relative lumpiness of investment and lower investment to capital ratio 
(see Table 4). As depicted in parameter θ01, a larger number of owners also reduces 
investment responsiveness to changes in sales.  
Comparing groups of farms with lower and higher ownership concentration shows 
ambiguous results regarding their performance differences. Contrary to expectations, farms 
with higher capital concentration display significantly lower their sales to capital ratio. 
Conversely, and in line with expectations on ownership concentration-related performance, 
these farms are assigned by significantly higher cash flow-to-capital ratio. One possible 
explanation of the unexpected differences in the sales-to-capital ratio could be different 
production structures, i.e. different capital versus labour-intensity of the production, for 
example due to different representation of more labour-intensive animal production in the 
production structure. However, comparing the shares of revenues from animal production in 
total revenues did not reveal any significant differences. Therefore, the lower sales-to-capital 
ratio assigning the groups of farms with higher capital concentration could be a result of 
higher capital value or capital undervaluation (with respect to the productive use of the asset) 
in farms with lower capital concentration.25 The cash flow to capital ratio, however, clearly 
shows higher performance of farms with higher capital concentration.  
The argument of possible differences in capital valuation between the two groups of farms 
with respect to capital concentration is supported by a comparison of other indicators in 
Table 4. The group of farms with higher ownership concentration displays higher investment 
activity when expressed in investment to capital ratio as well as investment to sales ratio; 
however, only the latter is found to be statistically significant. In line with the optimal 
investment decision, this result would suggest higher marginal productivity of capital in 
farms with higher capital concentration. Moreover, examining the investment activity over 
time reveals that farms with higher capital concentration show significantly higher 
investment activity, given by the investment to capital ratio in the first part of the observed 
period, i.e., in 1998-2003 compared to 2004-2008 (see Table A-5 in the Appendix). This 
could increase the value of capital in these farms when compared to significantly more 
depreciated capital used in farms with lower capital concentration.  
These systemic differences in capital valuation or capital depreciation between farms with 
higher and lower capital concentration, which affects the investment-to-capital ratio and 
sales-to-capital ratio, also have implications for the estimates of the error-correction 
accelerator model. The systemic capital value differences between farms are generally 
assumed to be depicted by the unobserved firm-specific effect term ηi in the investment 
model. In our case, however, this will also be captured in the capital concentration variable 
and all its cross terms. The most significant effect can be expected in the parameter of the 
capital concentration specific error-correction term, which reflects an inverse long-run 
                                                        
25 More ownership-concentrated farms are likely to be farms which did not acquire all original assets of 
the former farm they were successor to, but mainly the more productive assets, and thus also assets 
with higher bookkeeping value. This offloading of unproductive assets was likely mainly done with the 
objective to restructure and enhance efficiency.  
The divergences of book and real value of assets in the Czech Republic were also derived by the 
empirical study by Colombo and Revoltella (2003). Also, as Medonos (2006), from his investment 
analysis of Czech farms derived, farms with a rapid growth strategy decrease their assets' bookkeeping 
value faster to generate funds for reinvestment. 
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investment response to productivity of capital (sales-to-capital ratio). If this is significantly 
undervalued for farms with higher capital concentration due to high value capital when 
compared to farms with lower capital concentration, the parameter of the error-correction 
term, Ԅ02, could imply that farms with higher capital concentration overinvest. Indeed, this 
parameter is positive and larger than parameter Ԅ0, which indicates that capital 
concentration leads to the long-run adjustment of capital stock that is not congruent with 
optimal adjustment. In other words, this group of farms exceeds the optimal adjustment to 
the long-run capital optimum. As a result of capital valuation, this parameter needs to be 
interpreted with caution; its inclusion in the model is, however, important, as it filters out 
significant systemic ownership-specific variability in the data and thus improves the 
estimates of the remaining parameters. 
The estimates further disclose that there is an ownership concentration-specific investment 
activity response to past growth in capital stock. The value of the respective parameter, ρ12, 
suggests that farms with higher ownership concentration will invest significantly less in the 
current period if they invested in the previous period. This could imply that farms with more 
concentrated ownership invest in larger (relative to their capital stock), i.e. more lumpy, 
assets, since on average their investment activity is not lower than the investment activity of 
farms with lower ownership concentration. Furthermore, farms with higher ownership 
concentration show weaker investment responses to changes in sales. As Table 4 illustrates, 
these farms show significantly higher growth in sales than the group of farms with lower 
ownership concentration. Together with a lower investment response to the changes in sales, 
this would suggest that farms with higher ownership concentration follow a strategy of fast 
growth independent of short-term market signals.  
In line with theoretical predictions, parameter γ02 indicates that increasing capital 
concentration lowers farm investment sensitivity to internally-generated funds.26 This could 
validate our prediction that better corporate governance and better performance of the farms 
with higher capital concentration reduces managers’ tendency to prefer internal funds over 
debt, and contributes to optimizing the capital structure. Yet this result could also relate to 
the higher value of assets in these farms, which could be accepted by banks as collateral and 
thus reduce credit constraints. Conversely, parameter γ02 indicates the opposite for the 
investment sensitivity to past cash flow to capital. This result, which shows a positive 
relationship between investment activity and past cash flow, suggests that current and past 
cash flow to capital can represent different information in the investment model. While the 
current level of cash flow seems to represent currently available internal funds or current 
financial constraints, the past level of cash flow to capital depicts a longer-term effect on 
current investment, possibly as a proxy of future (expected) financial performance.  
The effect of external ownership-related factors (weaker incentives to active governance and 
costs of active governance, lower risk aversion, detachment from labour and performance 
objectives, smaller horizon and free-rider problem) is expected to have a mainly negative 
effect on farm performance, an ambiguous effect on optimality of investment, and a positive 
effect of investment sensitivity to cash flow. 
The results of the two-sample t–tests, as well as estimates of the error-correction accelerator 
model support these predictions. The group of farms with higher share of external ownership 
displays significantly lower scores of cash flow-to-capital, as well as sales-to-capital ratios, 
while exhibiting no differences in investment activity levels. This finding provides support for 
the hypotheses that external owners have weaker incentives to control management than 
employed owners, whose employment security is at stake, and that ownership among 
employees increases performance, especially with a decreasing share of external owners.  
                                                        
26 Our data confirm that group of farms with higher ownership concentration has significantly higher 
credit indebtedness (10.4% compared to 6.9% in the group of farms with lower ownership 
concentration). The gap in the credit indebtedness between the groups with higher and lower capital 
concentration has increased over the years.  
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The error-correction model estimates do not depict any external ownership-specific rate of 
investment adjustment to long-run capital optimum, but does depict a significant impact of 
the share of external ownership on investment response to past changes in sales and 
investment sensitivity to internal funds. The negative significant sign of the parameter θ23 
suggests that investment decisions of farms with a higher share of external ownership 
respond less sensitively to past changes in sale (market) signals than investment decisions of 
farms with a lower share of external ownership. The positive sign of the statistically 
significant (at the 10% significance level) parameter γ03 implies that investment activity of 
farms with a higher share of external ownership is more sensitive to generated internal 
funds27 than in the case of a higher share of employee ownership. The latter result is 
congruent with both the managerial discretion hypothesis, as well as the financial pessimism 
and horizon problem hypotheses. In line with the managerial discretion hypothesis and in 
connection with the previously discussed result of lower performance indicators (Table 4), 
farms with a higher share of external owners will have a lower probability of successful credit 
application, and thus a lower incentive to apply for a credit, since its rejection would reveal 
the low performance fact to the owners and thus lower their willingness to support financing 
investment projects from internal funds. The negative parameters θ03 and θ23, which refer to 
the external ownership-specific investment response to changes in sales, again support the 
above hypotheses. These parameters suggest that, contrary to external ownership, a higher 
share of employee ownership increases investment responses to changes in sales, which is in 
line with the hypothesis that employed owners respond more sensibly to market volatility, 
which can be a result of their higher risk aversion, as well as stronger incentives to control for 
investment decisions’ optimality. 
 
                                                        
27 Hobdari et al. (2010) find similar results for Estonian firms. Outsider-owned firms display 
sensitivity to both measures of availability of finance (internal and external) and suggest that these 
firms could suffer from high levels of managerial discretion and control. 
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Table 5. GMM estimates of the error-correction accelerator investment model for Czech 
agricultural enterprises in 1997-2007  
Dependent variable 
It/Kt-1 
Model 3 - AR(3, 3) error 
correction model with 
ownership-specific dynamics 
(without control variable TD) 
Model 4 - AR(3, 3) error 
correction model with 
ownership-specific dynamics 
(incl. control variable TD) 
Indep. var. Coef. Coef. estimate p-value Coef. estimate p-value 
Constant α0 0.062 0.319 0.061 0.508 
It-1/Kt-2 ρ0 -0.513 0.007 -0.648 0.004 
∆yt  θ0  - -  1.658 0.063 
∆yt-2 θ2 0.505 0.057 0.710 0.040 
kt-3 - yt-3 φ 0 -0.165 0.009 -0.222 0.008 
CFt/Kt-1 γ0 0.683 0.020 0.870 0.022 
Z1 (number of 
owners) α01  - -  - -  
Z1* It-1/Kt-2 ρ01 1.423 0.010 1.424 0.014 
Z1 * It-2/Kt-3 ρ11 0.740 0.033 0.809 0.069 
Z1 * ∆yt θ01  -  - -0.667 0.092 
Z1 * yt-2 φ01 -0.022 0.003 -0.027 0.014 
Z2 (cap. ownersh. 
conc.) α02  - -  - -  
Z2 * It-2/Kt-3 ρ12 -0.569 0.004 -0.526 0.062 
Z2 * ∆yt θ02 -0.325 0.138 -0.737 0.233 
Z2 * ∆yt-1 θ12 -0.416 0.104 -0.676 0.043 
Z2 * ∆yt-2 θ22 -0.571 0.238 -0.916 0.048 
Z2 * (kt-3 - yt-3) ∏02 0.231 0.020 0.312 0.016 
Z2 * CFt/Kt-1 γ02 -  -  -0.971 0.046 
Z2 * CFt-1/Kt-2 γ12 0.412 0.017 1.218 0.008 
Z3 (external 
ownership) α03  - -  - -  
Z3 * ∆yt θ03  - -  -1.122 0.147 
Z3 * ∆yt-2 θ23 -0.555 0.061 -0.765 0.037 
Z3 * CFt/Kt-1 γ03 0.131 0.279 0.442 0.072 
TD (transf. 
indebtedness) α04  -  - -1.380 0.212 
TD * ∆yt θ04 -   - -1.534 0.045 
TD * yt-2 φ04 -   - 0.133 0.202 
# of obs. 529 529 
Wald test (F-test) 4.25 (23) 0.000 2.70 (30) 0.000 
Wald test of joint significance*  2.13 (11) 0.026 2.34 (17) 0.005 
AR(2) test  -0.61 0.539 -0.61 0.539 
Hansen test 47.15 0.794 37.71 0.900 
Note: Coefficients for time dummies are not included in the table. Instruments used: a) for first differences 
equation - lags 1 to 3 of It-1/Kt-2, lags 1 of ∆yt-2, and CFt-1/Kt-2 in both models; b) for level equation - constant, 
∆yt, ∆yt-1, kt-3 - yt-3, Zn, (plus TD) time dummies and first differences of lags 1 of It-1/Kt-2, ∆yt-2, and CFt-1/Kt-2 
in Model 3 (Model 4). * Wald test of joint significance of ownership-specific investment variability. 
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4. Summary and concluding remarks 
Empirical results from an error-correction accelerator model estimated on Czech cooperative 
and corporate farms from 1997-2008 show that ownership structure has a significant impact 
on farm investment behaviour. Ownership constellations assigned by higher agency costs and 
a higher scope for managerial discretion reflect a higher sensitivity of investment to internal 
funds, thus representing internal credit constraints.  
Scale and scope achieved through the transformation of former collective farms into farms 
with (equity investment by) a large number of small share owners was found not to provide 
for sufficient economies that would outweigh the agency costs related to highly-dispersed 
ownership. Therefore, joint farm ownership by a large number of shareholders, which 
contributed to preserving large scale farms, does not prove to be motivated by economies of 
scale. The observed lower investment activity of the farms with a larger number of owners 
could be a rational response to lower returns to capital and an indication of the need for 
restructuring. However, the strategy of dispersed ownership allowed the value of ownership 
shares to be secured and, due to agricultural policy transfers (direct payments), possibly even 
increase. Moreover, this strategy certainly secured employment for many former employees, 
but particularly management. Nevertheless, without further effective restructuring, which 
requires an active share market and supporting institutions, farms with high ownership 
dispersion cannot be expected to successfully compete in the sector in the long-run. Without 
the active open share market, this form of ownership could facilitate restricted insider share–
trading, thus allowing mainly management to acquire a majority of shares and control over 
time.  
The group of farms with higher external ownership shows significantly higher investment 
sensitivity to cash flow to capital ratio, while at the same time being less productive and less 
profitable. Owners of farms with a higher share of external ownership thus seem to be more 
constrained in their control over management than farms with higher share of employee 
ownership. The empirical results are thus in line with the theoretical expectation that 
external ownership provides more scope for managerial discretion, which can lead to less 
optimal investment decisions and overall economic performance, and thus higher agency 
costs borne by the owners. Employee ownership, which is found to contribute to the 
performance of the farms, is, however, not warranted in the future, as employee ownership 
was a result of transformation laws. Share of employed owners can rather be expected to 
decrease with the retirement of currently employed owners, since retirees are interested in 
the financial settlement of ownership shares, and since it facilitates an internal share of buy-
outs by managers seeking ownership concentration.  
Results on the investment effect of ownership concentration suggest its significant 
contribution to investment performance. Relying to a higher degree on credit financing of 
investment projects, farms with higher per owner shares in farm equity display far highest 
profitability among considered groups of farms. This observation supports the theoretical 
expectation that higher ownership concentration provides incentives to more effective joint 
ownership governance.  
Some of the empirical results confirmed our predictions that considered the transition 
specificities of the given ownership forms and corporate environment, which challenged the 
empirical prove of the theoretically derived investment effect of managerial discretion. The 
analysis could be further challenged by the argument that the ownership structure is not 
exogenous, since the process of farm transformation was subjected to former managers' 
discretion. The resulting ownership structure and its investment impact could thus reflect 
also managers’ abilities, possibly their ideologies, degree of social responsibility or 
preferences. Despite these challenges regarding the conclusions on the investment effect of 
managerial discretion, the empirical results deliver great insights for the future developments 
of Czech farm structure under competitive pressure. Depending on the strength of the 
competitive pressure, farms with highly dispersed ownership among a large number of 
owners will require marked restructuring that might be possible through the liquidation or 
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gradual buy-outs of small shareholders, leading to higher ownership concentration. External 
owners will be required to implement tools of more efficient corporate governance, which is 
likely to be realized only with incentives from higher shares at stake. All results thus point to 
higher future ownership concentration of today's cooperative and corporate farms. 
Developing institutions to support the agricultural share market, which could attract 
investors from outside the current farms, could contribute to the speed and effectiveness of 
farm ownership restructuring. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Czech farm structure (number of farms of respective legal forms in numbers and 
average size of cultivated agricultural land) between 1989 and 2009. 
 Individual 
private farms 
Cooperatives Joint Stock 
Companies 
Limited 
liability 
companies 
State farms 
 Number Size Number Size Number Size Number Size Number Size 
1989 -   1,024  2,561  -  -  -  -  174  6,261  
1995 19,648  38.9  1,105  1,507  223  1,206  945  756  80  660  
2000 20,115  42.2  723  1,465  519  1,502  1,171  669  -  -  
2004 32,231  20.7  678  1,424  657  1,394  1,662  560  -  -  
2009 29,430  34.9  585  1,440  652  1,348  2,044  427  -  -  
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of the Czech Rep. (1994, 1996, 2001, 2005, 2010). 
Table A.2 Czech farm structure (percentage share of cultivated land by farms of respective 
legal forms in total agricultural land) between 1989 and 2009. 
 Individual 
private farms 
Cooperatives Joint Stock 
Companies 
Limited liability 
companies 
State farms 
1989 -  70.4  -  -  29.2  
1995 21.6  47.0  7.6  20.2  1.5  
2000 23.5  29.3  21.6  21.7  -  
2004 24.8  25.3  22.5  21.9  -  
2009 28.1  23.4  22.6  22.9  -  
Source: Ministry of Agriculture of the Czech Rep. (1994, 1996, 2001, 2005, 2010). 
Table A.3 Statistics of basic variables for 1997-2008 
 Number of 
observation 
Mean Stand. 
dev. 
Min Max 
It/Kt-1 1016 0.126 0.147 -0.548 1.797 
St/Kt 1016 0.959 0.419 0.052 3.938 
It/St-1 1016 0.128 0.225 -4.999 1.352 
CFt/Kt-1 1016 0.157 0.132 -0.306 1.027 
∆St/Kt-1 1016 0.005 0.153 -0.904 1.123 
Kt  1016 56.733 40.995 3.829 262.170 
St  1016 48.612 35.875 1.073 309.016 
CFt 1016 7.747 7.062 -13.694 48.574 
Number of owners*  121 327 388 2 3200 
External ownership* 1) 121 0.744 0.202 0.070 0.980 
Transformation indebtedness* 2)  121 0.283 0.306 0.000 1.388 
Capital (equity) concentration* 3) 121 0.372 1.307 -1.935 12.538 
Legal capital concentration* 4) 116 0.125 0.099 0.005 0.420 
Note: * Data from 2003 only; 1) Share of external owners in total number of owners; 2) Share of 
transformation liabilities (debt to persons with property claims in the company's assets) in total liabilities; 3) 
Per owner share in equity (in thousands CZK); 4) Per owner share in legal capital (in thousands CZK). 
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Table A.4 Correlation between ownership variables Zs (year 2003) 
Correlation between 
continuous ownership 
variables  
Ownership 
concentration 
Share of 
external owners 
Number of 
owners 
Transformation 
indebtedness 
Ownership concentration  1.000    
Share of external owners  -0.312 1.000   
Number of owners  -0.123 0.397 1.000  
Transformation indebtedness  -0.140 -0.353 -0.357 1.000 
Spearman correlation 
between ownership dummy 
variables 
Ownership 
concentration 
(dummy) 
Share of 
external owners 
(dummy) 
Number of 
owners 
(dummy) 
Transformation 
indebtedness 
(dummy) 
Ownership concentration 
(dummy) 1.000    
Share of external owners 
(dummy) -0.229 1.000   
Number of owners (dummy) -0.131 0.476 1.000  
Transformation indebtedness 
(dummy) -0.313 -0.374 -0.487 1.000 
 
Table A.5 Mean statistics comparison and two-sample t-test for farm ownership groups for 
time periods 1997-2002 and 2003-2008 (in real prices of 1997). 
 Owners’ number Ownership concentration1) External ownership2) 
 < 
median 
≥ 
median 
p-
value* 
< 
median 
≥ 
median 
p-
value* 
< 
median 
≥ 
median 
p-
value* 
1997-2002          
It/Kt-1 0.107 0.106 0.972 0.093 0.116 0.016 0.104 0.106 0.857 
St/Kt 1.011 0.863 0.000 0.969 0.905 0.070 0.969 0.860 0.005 
It/St-1 0.112 0.120 0.454 0.103 0.126 0.033 0.109 0.126 0.177 
CFt/Kt-1 0.146 0.108 0.000 0.111 0.142 0.002 0.137 0.102 0.001 
∆St/Kt-1 0.000 0.006 0.711 -0.009 0.012 0.124 0.003 -0.002 0.740 
Kt 3)  36.069 82.284 0.000 50.896 64.408 0.000 57.485 65.322 0.040 
St 3) 29.881 70.215 0.000 43.969 52.078 0.007 49.253 53.761 0.221 
CFt 4.248 8.729 0.000 5.057 7.389 0.000 6.985 6.305 0.249 
2003-08          
It/Kt-1 0.167 0.130 0.025 0.149 0.152 0.865 0.149 0.148 0.947 
St/Kt 1.032 0.932 0.012 1.017 0.968 0.212 0.990 0.955 0.417 
It/St-1 0.139 0.139 0.994 0.121 0.157 0.137 0.150 0.129 0.457 
CFt/Kt-1 0.215 0.156 0.000 0.175 0.197 0.073 0.194 0.169 0.052 
∆St/Kt-1 0.006 0.006 0.975 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.318 
Kt 3)  36.892 77.651 0.000 48.248 62.597 0.000 55.366 59.330 0.305 
St 3) 31.902 68.997 0.000 43.332 54.898 0.000 47.749 51.991 0.208 
CFt 6.708 11.600 0.000 7.483 10.323 0.000 8.888 9.227 0.627 
Note: * P-value for a two-sample t-test; 1) per owner share in equity (in thousands CZK); 2) share of the 
number of external owners in total number of owners; 3) in millions CZK; 4) indebtedness rate from 
ownership transformation (debts toward eligible persons from transformation in value of total assets); 5) per 
owner share in legal capital (in thousands CZK).  
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Table A.6 OLS and Fixed Effect estimates of Model 1 and Model 2. 
Dependent variable 
It/Kt-1 
Model 1 - Basic AR(2, 2) error 
correction model (s = 2) 
Model 2 - AR(3, 3) error 
correction model (s = 3) 
OLS Fixed effect OLS Fixed effect 
Indep. var. Coef. Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P 
Constant α0 0.144 0.049 2.842 0.000 0.197 0.027 2.651 0.001 
It-1/Kt-2 ρ0 -0.082 0.042 -0.372 0.000 -0.096 0.038 -0.407 0.000 
It-2/Kt-3 ρ1 - - - - -0.096 0.052 -0.481 0.000 
∆yt  θ0 0.080 0.034 0.122 0.006 0.105 0.018 0.113 0.031 
∆yt-1 θ1 0.077 0.058 0.144 0.008 0.090 0.071 0.130 0.051 
∆yt-2 θ2 - - - - 0.114 0.025 0.220 0.005 
kt-s - yt-s 0 -0.060 0.000 -0.491 0.000 -0.050 0.001 -0.527 0.000 
yt-s φ0 -0.006 0.330 -0.249 0.000 -0.011 0.158 -0.228 0.001 
CFt/Kt-1 γ0 0.231 0.000 0.175 0.005 0.252 0.000 0.222 0.002 
CFt-1/Kt-2 γ1 0.180 0.001 0.174 0.005 0.234 0.001 0.257 0.001 
CFt-2/Kt-3 γ2 - - - - -0.011 0.877 -0.008 0.914 
# of obs. 850 850 689 689 
Overall fit (F-test) 16.36 0.000 18.40 0.000 18.27 0.000 13.41 0.000 
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